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CHAPTER 8 
Workmen's Compensation 
SURVEY Staff* 
§ 8.1. Introduction. During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial 
Court considered three cases' concerning the limits of workers' compensa-
tion as an exclusive remedy for an industrial injury. One case considered 
what types of harm are included in the definition of "personal injury." 2 
Another considered the validity of the "dual capacity" doctrine, 3 which 
permits an employer to be sued in tort for acts, committed in a capacity 
other than as an employer, which cause an employee to be injured. • The 
third case considered the right of an employee's family members to sue an 
employer for injuries which they suffer as a result of an employee's com-
pensable inj~ry. s Although the decisions generally maintained narrow limits 
on employer immunity, the Court failed to identify any general principles 
which should be controlling in determining the extent of employer immuni-
ty in future Massachusetts workmen's cempensation cases. The practitioner 
handling future cases which present questions of first impression, therefore, 
is advised to pay special attention to the specific situation, statute, and case 
law relevant to each case, as prediction in this area is uncertain. 
The general provisions governing worker's compensation as an exclusive 
remedy are found in chapter 152, sections 23 and 24 of the General Laws. 
The statutes literally bar an injured employee from bringing the common 
law claims for damages based on personal injury unless the employee has 
not claimed compensation6 and has given written notice to his employer that 
he claims the right. 7 Even if these requirements are not met, the Supreme 
Judicial Court has noted that the statute does not bar all common law ac-
*Written by the SURVEY Staff based on a manuscript by LAURENCE S. LOCKE and 
RICHARD S. DUTKA. LAURENCE S. LOCKE is a partner in the Boston law firm of Petkun 
& Locke, Inc. and is the author of the Massachusetts Practice Series volume on Workmen's 
Compensation. RICHARD S. DUTKA is an associate at Petkun & Locke, Inc. 
§ 8.1. ' Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2113, 413 N.E.2d 711; Longever v. 
Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1767,408 N.E.2d 857; Ferriter v. Daniel 
O'Connell Sons, Inc. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2075, 413 N.E.2d 690. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2117, 413 N.E.2d at 714. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1769, 408 N.E.2d at 859 . 
• /d. 
' See 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2088, 413 N.E.2d at 698. 
• G.L. c. 152, § 23. 
' G.L. c. 152, § 24. 
1
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tions which may arise out of the injury causing incident. • In the Survey year 
the Court identified specifically some of the actions which may be :rpaintain-
ed by an employee and his family without violating the terms of the statute. 
In addition to the three cases on the limits of employer immunity to ac-
tions arising out of personal· injury to an employee, the Court also con-
sidered the related issue of when an employer's insurer for workmen's com-
pensation, who pays benefits upon the employee's death, can claim reim-
bursement from monies received by the beneficiaries and others. The 
specific issue facing the Court was whether such an insurer could be reim-
bursed where the beneficiaries and others win a money judgment in a suit 
for wrongful death and loss of consortium against a third party actually 
liable for the wrongful death.' 
There were also important developments in workmen's compensation law 
during the Survey year outside the courtroom. The legislature amended sec-
tion 15 of chapter 152 of the General Laws to give the injured employee a 
period of time with the exclusive right to sue any third party responsible for 
his or her injuries. 10 At the federal level, new health and safety regulations, 
requiring that certain records be kept on employee health and exposure to 
toxic substances, 11 may give employees claiming work-related injuries im-
proved access to important information. 
§ 8.2. Personal Injury-Injury to Dipity-Compensadon Not an Ex-
clusive Remedy. The Workmen's Compensation Act (the "Act") appears, 
in sections 23 and 24, to bar employees who do not meet the specific re-
quirements of those sections 1 from maintaining any action against an 
employer based on personal injury. Nevertheless, the Court has, through 
dicta and implication, long taken the view that the statutory term ''personal 
injury'' had limited meaning. z A case decided during the Survey year, Foley 
v. Polaroid Corp. 3 helped to clarify this issue. 
In 1916, the Supreme Judicial Court, by way of dicta, remarked upon the 
distinction made between "personal injury" as used in its broadest sense, 
and "personal injury" for the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act.• The Court noted that an act such as libel, malicious prosecution and 
• See text and notes at notes 1-6 infra at §5.2. 
• Eisner v. Hertz Corp., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1667, 1668-69, 407 N.E.2d 1286, 1287-88. 
•• Acts of 1980, c. 488. 
" See 29 C.F.R. §1910.20 (1980). 
§ 8.2. ' Chapter 152, section 23 requires the employee to refuse compensation in order to 
be able to sue. In addition, section 24 still prevents suit unless the employee has notified the 
employer in writing of his intention not to waive. 
' See text and notes at notes 4-19 infra for a review of cases implying a limited scope for the 
term "personal injury." 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2113, 413 N.E.2d 711. 
• In Re Madden, 222 Mass. 487, 492, 111 N.E. 379, 381 (1916). 
2
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false imprisonment, invasion of privacy, alienation of affection of husband 
and wife, seduction, and false arrest are all personal injuries, but that such 
injuries would not be personal injuries under the Workmen's Compensation 
Act.' The Court made this observation, however, in the context of a wide 
ranging discussion on whether physical impact was necessary for there to be 
injury.' The case provided a clue as to where the law might lie in these situa-
tions, but it had little legal merit as precedent. 
In Zygmuntowicz v. American Steel & Wire Co., 7 the plaintiff, after be-
ing discharged by the employer, was assaulted by co-employees and thrown 
to the ground.• Upon finding a revolver on the plaintiff, the watchmen 
handcuffed him and the police took him to jail.' He was prosecuted and ac-
quitted.10 The plaintiff then brought suit against his employer claiming 
assault and battery, false arrest and imprisonment, and malicious prosecu-
tion, 11 and received a favorable jury verdict on each count. 12 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court explicitly found an assault on the 
job to be a personal injury within the meaning-of the Act. 13 It therefore held 
that the trial court erred in denying the defendant a directed verdict on that 
issue. 14 Nevertheless, without even discussing the exclusivity of the 
workmen's compensation remedy, the Court affirmed the superior court's 
denial of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict with regard to the 
allegations of false arrest and imprisonment and malicious prosecution,~' 
The only error which the Court found regarding those allegations related to 
the lower court's instructing that it was irrelevant whether the defendant's 
employees were acting as the defendant's agents. 16 There was a strong im-
plication that, if the jury found the employees to be agents of the defen-
dant, the injuries allegedly sustained by the employee due to false imprison-
ment and malicious prosecution would not be personal injuries under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. 17 
More recently, in 1978, the Supreme Judicial Court reinstated a jury ver-
dict for a plaintiff-employee against the employer and a co-employee for 
' /d. 
• ld. at 491-92, 111 N.E. at 381. 
' 240 Mass. 421, 134 N.E. 385 (1922). 
• /d. at 423, 134 N.E. at 386-87. 
' /d. at 423, 134 N.E. at 387 . 
•• /d. 
" /d. at 423, 134 N.E. at 386. 
12 /d. 
" /d. at 424, 134 N.E. at 387. 
14 ld. 
" /d. at 425, 111 N.E. at 388. 
" /d. at 425-26, 134 N.E. at 388. 
17 See id. 
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slanderous statements made at a grievance board hearing. 18 The Court 
analyzed the case as presenting a question of whether statements by 
witnesses at such a hearing are absolutely privileged. 19 The case gives no in-
dication that any of the parties raised the issue of workmen's compensation 
as an exclusive remedy, nor did the Court bring up that issue on its own. 
Thus, when Foley was decided, there was some precedent by dicta and 
implication that the term "personal injury" in the Act was to be construed 
narrowly. Nevertheless, the supportive reasoning for the limits of what con-
stitutes a personal injury under the Workmen's Compensation Act, was left 
to be developed by creative lawyering. 
Foley, a Polaroid employee, was charged by a co-employee with assault 
and rape during a midnight shift. 20 Polaroid conducted a private investiga-
tion during which they were alleged to have gone beyond the scope of prop-
er investigation to the point of instigating the filing of criminal charges 
against Foley. 21 Foley was indicted, tried, and acquitted on both charges. 22 
He lost time at work, allegedly due to the emotional and physical distress 
and injury. 23 
Thereafter, Foley sued Polaroid for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, malicious prosecution, injury to his reputation, and violation of his 
civil rights. 24 Foley's wife claimed that Polaroid's acts had caused damage 
to the marriage resulting in a loss of consortium. B The superior court 
dismissed Foley's complaint based on Polaroid's argument that the tort ac-
tion and the action for loss of consortium were barred by the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. 26 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the superior court's dismissal of so 
much of the complaint as alleged intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. 27 Citing Fitzgibbons's Case, 21 the Court noted that "emotional 
distress arising out of employment [is] a personal injury under the act. " 29 In 
response to Foley's argument that in Fitzgibbons's Case, the claimant's dis-
tress did not result from the employer's conduct, 30 the Court stated that 
Albanese's Case31 made such distinctions invalid. 32 Albanese's Case, the 
" Ezekiel v. Jones Motor Co., Inc., 374 Mass. 382, 384, 372 N.E.2d 1281, 1283 (1978). 
' 9 /d. at 385, 372 N.E.2d at 1284. 
20 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2113-14, 413 N.E.2d at 712. 
" Id. at 2114, 413 N.E.2d at 712. 
" Id. 
23 /d. 
24 /d. (quoting 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 72.80 at l54 (Supp. 
1979)). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1770, 408 N.E.2d at 859. 
26 /d. at 1772, 408 N.E.2d at 860. 
" /d. at 1771 n. 7, 408 N.E.2d at 860 n. 7. 
" /d. at 1769, 408 N.E.2d at 859. 
29 /d. at 1770, 408 N.E.2d at 859. 
30 1 R. HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1.6 at 15 (2d ed. 1974). 
" 1 See Riley v. Davison Const. Co., Inc., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1995, 2001, 409 N.E.2d 
1279, 1283. 
" See 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1772, 408 N.E. 2d at 860. 
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Gourt noted, made it clear that "recovery may be had under the compen-
sation act when such injury results from specific incidents involving friction 
with co-workers over the implementation of company policy. " 33 The Court 
thus concluded that Foley's "severe emotional distress resulting from 
defendant's conduct relative to the charges of rape and assault, is compen-
sable under the act .... " 34 The tort action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress was therefore barred. 35 
Foley fared better in the other elements of his case. Citing the distinction 
between personal injuries in general and those covered by the Act36 the 
Court held that "the employee's claim for injury to his reputation [defama-
tion] is not the type of personal injury contemplated by G.L. c. 152. " 37 The 
gist of a defamation action, the Court noted, was injury to reputation 
regardless of the physical or mental harm which may be alleged as elements 
of damage in the claim. 31 Such damages were deemed "peripheral" to the 
main thrust of the action. 39 The Court noted that compensation differed 
from tort damages in that its goal was to provide relief from the inability to . 
earn wages. 40 
In regard to Foley's claim for malicious prosecution, the Court once 
again noted that the ''essence of the tort is not physical or mental injury.' ' 41 
Rather, the Court said, such an action deals primarily with interference with 
the plaintiff's right to be free from unjustifiable litigation. 42 Thus, the 
Court reversed the superior court's dismissal of the malicious prosecution 
claim. 43 
The Court also held that the alleged violation of Foley's civil rights was 
not a compen·sable injury under the Act. 44 It stated that it "would, of 
course, be reluctant to hold that civil rights violations were a hazard of 
employment in the Commonwealth. " 45 The Court explained this comment 
by ruling that the Act protects an employee only in regard to injuries arising 
out of the " 'nature, conditions, obligations, or incidents of the employ-
ment.' " 46 Accordingly, the lower court's dismissal of Foley's civil rights 
claim was reversed. 47 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2118, 413 N.E.2d at 714-15. 
,. /d., 413 N.E.2d at 715. 
" /d. 
" /d. at 2119, 413 N.E.2d at 715. 
" /d. 
" /d. at 2119-20, 413 N.E.2d at 715. 
" /d. at 2120, 413 N.E.2d at 715 . 
•• /d. 
" /d. at 2120, 413N.E.2d at 716. 
42 /d. 
" Id. 
" /d. at 2121, 413 N.E.2d at 716. 
"/d. 
" /d. at n.S, 413 N.E.2d at 716 n.S (quoting Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 502, 26 N.E.2d 
328, 330 (1940)). 
" /d. at 2121-22, 413 N.E.2d at 716. 5
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Finally, the Court considered Mrs. Foley's claim for loss of her 
husband's society and companionship. Citing Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell 
Sons, Inc., 41 the companion case issued on the same day as Foley, the Court 
held that the compensation act does not bar such claims. 49 
In summing up its position, the Court noted that the distinction between 
claims for malicious prosecution or defamation versus a claim for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress should be clear: the essence of the 
former torts was not physical or mental injury-although such injury might 
be incidental-while mental harm is the essence of the tort of intentional in-
fliction of mental distress. 50 To further clarify its position, the Court also 
notedthat the central issue in determingwhether the Act precludes a com-
mon law right of action is the nature of the injury for which the plaintiff 
makes a claim, not the nature of the defendant's act. 51 Foley's Case 
established clearly that defamation, malicious prosecution, and civil rights 
violations stand outside the definition of personal injury for purposes of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. What is deemed to be at stake in such 
claims is the injury to a defined right, such as the right to be free from un-
justifiable litigation, 52 rather than mental or physical injury, alone. 53 
The Court's distinction between injury to a defined right, with an in-
cidental mental or physical injury, and torts which have mental or physical 
injury as their essence, begins a trend. This trend allows the employee to sue 
the employer both under the Act and at common law for a mental or 
physical injury. An original intent of the Workmen's Compensation Act 
was to relieve the employee of rebutting the employer's common law 
defenses in suits based on an injury on the job. 54 The Act, therefore, was 
not meant to create for the employer a vast immunity from liability for 
various other losses which it may have caused the employee. There appears, 
therefore, to be a trend to afford the employee an array of remedies ap-
propriate to the various forms of losses she or he may have suffered at the 
employer's hands. 
§ 8.3. Dual Capacity Doctrine-Separate Divisions of One Em-
ployer-Compensation as Exclusive Remedy. During the Survey year, the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that an employee injured in the course of using 
the employer's machinery may not maintain a products liability suit against 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2075, 413 N.E.2d 690. Ferriter is discussed at § 5.3 infra. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2121, 413 N.E.2d at 716. 
' 0 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2120, 413 N.E.2d at 716. 
" Id. at 2120-21, 413 N.E.2d at 716 (citing Gambrell v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 
Inc., 562 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Mo. App. 1978)). 
" See id. at 2120, 413 N.E.2d at 716. 
" See id. 
" See Longever v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1767, 1770, 408 
N.E.2d 857, 859. 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1980 [1980], Art. 11
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1980/iss1/11
§ 8.3 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 315 
the employer, even if the machinery was manufactured by a wholly separate 
and distinct division of the corporate employer. • In this instance, the. Court 
rejected the approach of several other states allowing common law actions 
against an insured employer under the "dual capacity" doctrine. 2 As ex-
plained by Larson, 
[u]nder this doctrine, an employer normally shielded from tort liabili-
ty by the exclusive remedy principle may become liable in tort to his 
own employee if he occupies, in additionto his capacity as employer, 
a second capacity that confers on him obligations independent of 
those imposed on him as employer. 3 
This doctrine, has been held to include the employer as a landowner, 4 as 
shipowner or bareboat charterer,' or, in a notable case, as a tr~ating physi-
cian of the doctor's own injured. employee. 6 In California and Ohio the doc-
trine has been interpreted to allow suit against t~ employer as manufac-
turer or distributor of the product causing injury. 7 Nevertheless, the first at-
tempt in Massachusetts to bring suit based on the theory that the employer 
also functioned in a second capacity failed. 8 
In Longever v. Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. 9 the plaintiff was an em-
ployee of the Edes Division of the defendant, Revere Copper and Brass, 
Inc. 10 In March 1977, while operating a casting machine, Longever sus-
tained a severe and permanent injury. 11 The casting machine was manufac-
tured by the defendant's Rome Division. 12 Edes and Rome are wholly 
separate and distinct, and Revere treated each as an entity unto itself. 13 
Rome sold its machinery to the general public as well as to the Edes Divi-
sion.14 
The plaintiff brought a products liability suit for defective machinery 
against Revere.•' The superior court dismissed the complaint and the 
§ 8.3. 1 Longever v. Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., 1980Mass. Adv. Sh. 1767, 1767-71, 
408 N.E.2d 857, 858-59. 
' !d. at 1771, 408 N.E.2d at 860. 
' 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 72.80 (1976). 
• State v. Luckie, 145 So. 2d 239, 241, 243 (Fla. 1962). 
' Reed v. Yaka, 373 U.S. 410, 414-16 (1963). 
• Dupreyv. Shane, 39Cal. 2d 781, 792-93,249P.2d 8,15 (1952); accordGuyv. Arthur H. 
Thomas Co., 55 Ohio St. 2d 183, 189-90, 378 N.E.2d 488, 492 (1978). 
' Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 107 Cal. Rptr. 797,799 (1977); 
Mercer v. Uniroyal Inc., 49 Ohio App. 2d 279, 283, 285-86, 361 N.E.2d 492, 495, 496 (1977). 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1767, 1770, 408 N.E.2d 857, 859. 
' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1767, 408 N.E.2d 857. 
10 -/d. at 1768, 408 N.E.2d at 858. 
II Jd. 
12 /d. 
13 /d. 
14 /d. 
" /d. at n.3. 
7
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Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. 16 In support of his position, the plaintiff 
expressly relied on the dual capacity doctrine. 17 He argued that Revere was 
liable based on obligations imposed on it as a manufacturer, and therefore 
the suit was not barred by the Workmen's Compensation Act. 11 
The Court disagreed. It held that the duties of an employer who also 
manufactures the equipment used by the employees are not separate and 
distinct from the general obligations owed to the employee by the 
employer. 19 The Court rested its opinion on the fact that one of the com-
mon law duties of the employer was the responsibility to provide safe and 
suitable tools and appliances. 20 Before enactment of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, an employee could sue the employer in tort for failure to 
provide safe tools. 21 According to the Court, the Workmen's Compensation 
Act, in substituting a fixed compensation for injuries occurring at work for 
the common law right of action, did not alter the employer's duty to pro-
vide safe machinery. 22 Rather, the Court found the remedy for the 
employer's failure to comply with that common law duty is now embraced 
by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 23 
The Court went on to state the proposition that " '[d]ual capacity re-
quires a distinct separate legal persona, not just a separate theory of liabil-
ity .... ' " 24 In the Court's opinion, the existence of separate divisions was 
insufficient to establish dual capacity. 25 Any dissatisfaction, the Court 
stated, with the inadequacies of the Workmen's Compensation Act as the 
exclusive remedy to this type of injury would best be brought to the 
legislature and not the courts. 26 
It is important to note, however, that in rejecting Longever's dual capac-
ity claim, the Court explicitly left open the possibility of the doctrine's 
application in other circumstances. 27 The door is not yet closed, therefore, 
on all possible dual capacity claims. 
The analysis and result in Longever are neither well-reasoned nor good 
policy. The Court itself noted that the employer still owes a duty to provide 
its employees with safe machinery. 21 This obligation, the Court ruled, is sub-
" /d. at 1768, 408 N.E.2d at 858. 
17 /d. at 1769, 408 N.E.2d at 858-59. 
" Id. at 1768, 408 N.E.2d at 858. 
" /d. at 1770-71, 408 N.E.2d at 859. 
20 Id. at 1769, 408 N.E.2d at 859. 
21 /d. at 1770, 408 N.E.2d at 859. 
22 ld. 
2J /d. 
24 /d. (quoting 2A A. LARSON, WoRKMEN's CoMPENSATION LAW, § 72.80 at 154 (Supp. 
1979)). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1770, 408 N.E.2d at 859. 
20 /d. at 1772, 408 N.E.2d at 860. 
27 /d. at 1771 n. 7, 408 N.E.2d at 860 n. 7. 
•• /d. at 1769, 408 N.E.2d at 859. 
8
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sumed under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 29 The duties of a manu-
facturer, however, are clearly distinct from those of the employer. The 
manufacturer must manufacture a product which is not harmful or defec-
tive. 30 It is important to note that had Revere not been able to manufacture 
its own machinery, it would have had to purchase the casting machine from 
a third party. In that case, the employee would clearly have had a viable 
third party suit. An employee's rights should not depend arbitrarily on the 
choice (based on wealth, business acumen or chance) made by the employer 
to purchase rather than manufacture, at least through a separate division, 
its equipment and machinery. In the current era of corporate con-
glomerates, business mergers, and product diversification, employees will 
be working in ever greater numbers for employers who maintain various 
divisions which serve and supply one another. Longever places a significant 
restriction on the remedies available to the employee. 
The decision will be a disincentive to the employer to create a safe work-
ing environment. An employer shielded from liability has little fiscal or 
legal pressure to maintain or increase the care used in the design and 
manufacture of tools and appliances to be used in another corporate divi-
sion. Immunity breeds irresponsibility. 
An underlying policy of the law disfavors immunity from suit and an 
equally strong policy disfavors deprivation of common law rights without 
clear statutory authority. 31 In Longever, the Court has broadened the 
employer's immunity without clear statutory authority. It would have been 
more logical for the Court to view the manufacturing division in question as 
a manufacturer liable for all harm caused by its products. Following this 
more logical course would show that any decision to grant immunity from 
such liability is a major broadening of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 
and thus the very sort of judicial legislation which the Court claimed to be 
avoiding. 32 
§ 8.4. Waiver of Common Law Rights-Suit by Family Members of In-
jured Employee. The most publicized workmen's compensation case of the 
Survey year was Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc. 1 In this case the 
Supreme Judicial Court, by 4 to 3 decision, 2 held that the Act does not bar a 
suit by a spouse and minor dependent children against an insured employer 
for their claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consor-
20 Id. at 1770, 408 N.E.2d at 8S9. 
so 1 R. HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCI'S LIABILITY§ 1.6 at IS (2d ed. 1974) • 
., See Rileyv. Davison Const. Co., Inc., 1980Mass. Adv. Sh. 199S, 2001, 409N.E.2d 1279, 
1283. 
,. See 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1772,408 N.E. 2d at 860. 
§ 8.4. • 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 207S, 413 N.E.2d 690. 
• /d. at 2099, 2110, 2111, 413 N.E.2d at 703, 709, 710. 
9
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tium, and loss of parental society, even though the injured employee 
himself was collecting benefits under the Act. 3 
Michael Ferriter, working for the defendant as a carpenter, was seriously 
injured when a load of beams fell from a hoist~ striking him in the neck. 4 
Ferriter was hospitalized and has been paralyzed from the neck down since 
the accident.' Ferriter's wife and young children first saw him in this condi-
tion in the hospital shortly after the accident.~ Ferriter received benefits 
under the Act for the injury. 1 
Mrs. Ferriter and the two children brought suit for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress, • loss of consortium,' and loss of parental society. 10 The 
defendap.t contended that all of the claims were barred by the Workmen's 
Compensation Act, in that workers' compensation was the exclusive 
remedy for Ferriter's injury. 11 The. Supreme Judicial Court held that none 
of the claims was barred by the Act. 12 
The Court's analysis of the workmen's compensation issue was 
straightforward: it first recognized that the Workmen's Compensation Act 
required an employee to give up his common law rights against the 
employer. 13 The Court observed, however, that an employee could give 
notice that he or she wished to preserve common law rights and reject com-
pensation. 14 The Court then noted that the employee in Ferriter had both 
failed to give notice that he wanted to preserve his rights under chapter 152, 
section 24, and had accepted compensation, which constituted a release 
under chapter 152, section 23." Thus, according to the Court, there was no 
' Jd. at 2075, 2097-98, 413 N.E.2d at 691, 703. 
• ld. at 2076, 413 N.E.2d at 691. 
'ld . 
• ld. 
1 Jd. 
• ld. at 2085; 413 N.E.2d at 696. The claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress was 
based on an extension of the principles announced in Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 
380 N .E.2d 1295 (1978). Dziokonski established the right of a parent to sue for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress where the parent either witnessed the accident to his or her child or 
carne on the scene while the child was still there, and where the parent suffered substantial 
physical injury as a result.ld. at '568, 380 N .E.2d at 1302. In Ferriter, the Court agreed with the 
plaintiff that recovery can be had for substantial physical injury when such injury arises from 
first seeing the injured spouse/parent in the hospital, so long as the shock followed "closely on 
the heels of the accident." 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2086, 413 N.E.2d at 697. See§ 6.1, infra. 
• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2077, 413 N.E.2d at 692. 
10 Jd. The dependent children's claim for loss of parental society was based on an extension 
of the right of a spouse to sue for loss of consortium wkich was established in Diaz v. Eli Lilly 
& Co., 364 Mass. 153, 167-68, 302 N.E.2d 555, 564, (1973). In a careful discussion of Diaz and 
numerous other cases, as well as the array of scholarly commentary on the topic, the Court 
agreed that the children's claim was viable. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2077-85, 413 N.E.2d at 
692-96. See § 6.2, infra. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2076-77, 413 N.E.2d at 692. 
" Jd. at 2098, 413 N.E.2d at 703. 
" ld. at 2087-88, 413 N.E.2d at 697-98. 
14 Jd. at 2088, 413 N.E.2d at 698. 
" ld. 
10
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dispute that the employee had waived his rights.•' The Court characterized 
the issue at hand as whether the employee's waiver barred his family from 
recovering against the employer for damage suffered by them. 17 
To decide the issue, the Court first pointed out that, only three years after 
the 1911 enactment of the progenitor of chapter 152, section 24, 11 it held in 
King v. Viscoloid Co. 19 that a son's waiver under the statute could not waive 
his parent's independent right to recover for her own injuries. 20 In quoting 
the old statute, the Ferriter Court added emphasis to support its view that 
the language appeared to expressly limit waiver to the employee only: 
" '[a]n employee of a subscriber shall be held to have waived his right of ac-
tion .... ' " 21 The Court then ruled that neither the King rule nor the perti-
nent language of the statute had changed since 1914. 22 After reviewing cases 
since 1914,23 the Court concluded that the limited language of chapter 152, 
section 24 would make it unfair to hold that an employee can waive any per-
son's common law rights but his or her own. 24 
In his majority opinion, Judge Liacos considered King a binding prece-
dent in view of its prominence in scholarly discussion, its progeny in later 
Massachusetts cases, and the legislature's failure to alter the provisions of 
section 24 since its passage. 25 
The Court went on to make two further clarifications. First, the fact that 
the family members were dependents under section 35A of the Act was held 
not to bar their common law suit. 26 Although not explained fully in the 
opinion, it appears that the employer in Ferriter tried to base an argument 
on chapter 152, section 23, which states that an employee who accepts com-
pensation payments is held to have released all common law claims against 
his or her employer. 27 Under chapter 152, section 35A, dependents of an in-
jured employee can receive compensation in certain situations. 28 Apparent-
ly, the employer argued that the eligibility of dependents to receive com pen-
16 /d. 
17 /d. 
" /d. at 2088-89,413 N.E.2d at 698. The old statute was Acts of 1911, c. 751, Part I§ 5. The 
pertinent parts of chapter 152, section 24 are as follows: "[a]n employee shall be held to have 
waived his right of action at common law . . . if he shall not have given his employer written 
notice that he claimed such right. . . . " /d. 
" 219 Mass. 420, 106 N.E. 988 (1914). 
' 0 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2089, 413 N.E.2d at 698. 
" /d. (citing Acts of 1911, c. 751, Part I, § 5). 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2090, 413 N.E.2d at 699. 
" /d. at 2090-91, 413 N.E.2d at 699. 
" /d. at 2091, 413 N.E.2d at 699. 
" /d. at 2092-94, 413 N.E.2d at 700-0l. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2095 n.27, 413 N.E.2d at 702 n.27. 
" See /d. The pertinent part of chapter 152, section 23 is as follows: "[i]f an employee files 
any claim for, or accepts payment of compensation . . . such action shall constitute a 
release .... " /d. 
" The pertinent part of chapter 152, section 35A is as follows: "[w]here the injured 
employee has persons conclusively presumed to be dependent upon him or in fact so depend-
ent, the sum of six dollars shall be added to the weekly compensation payable .... " I d. 
11
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sation under section 35A should trigger a release of the dependents' claims, 
under section 23. 29 After first agreeing with the employer that it was irrele-
vant whether the dependents in question actually received benefits, 30 the 
Court ruled against the employer on the main issue. 31 The Court's position 
was based on the statutory language of section 23 that receipt of compensa-
tion by the employee releases the employer from liability. 32 Family members 
of injured employees are not, the Court held, employees under the Act. 33 
The Court, in a further effort to clarify its decision, acknowledged that in 
cases where the employee dies, family members may not pursue their claims 
for loss of consortium against the employer. 34 This is because chapter 152, 
sections 1(4) and 6835 do not allow actions under the wrongful death 
statute36 by dependents of employees covered by the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act. 37 In spite of this rule, the Court rejected the defendant's claim 
that the differing treatment afforded family members of injured employees, 
who could recover for loss of consortium, and those of a deceased 
employee, who could not, created an anomalous situation. 38 The Court 
noted that the two categories of dependents have historically been con-
sidered separately by the legislature. 39 
Finally, it should be noted that the Court observed that further pro-
ceedings in Ferriter may necessitate determining the vitality of the fellow 
servant rule40 in Massachusetts. 41 It chose not to consider the issue at that 
time because neither party had briefed it. 42 
" See 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2095 n.27, 413 N.E.2d at 702 n.27. 
•• /d. If the employee's own benefits are high enough, as Mr. Ferriter's were, there can be no 
dependent's benefits under section 35A. Id.; G.L. c. 152, § 35A. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2095 n.27, 413 N.E.2d at 702 n.27. 
" See note 27 supra for the relevant text of chapter 152, section 23. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2095 n.27, 413 N.E.2d at 702 n.27. 
" /d. at 2096, 413 N.E.2d at 702. 
" The pertinent part of chapter 152, section 1(4) states: "any reference to an employee who 
has been injured shall, when the employee is dead, also include his legal representatives, 
dependents and other persons to whom compensation may be payable." G.L. c. 152 § 1(4). 
The pertinent part of chapter 152, section 68 states: "sections two Band six C to six F, in-
clusive, of chapter two hundred and twenty-nine shall not apply to employees of an insured 
person or a self-insurer .... "G.L. c. 152 § 68. The general title of chapter 229 is "Actions for 
Death and Injuries Resulting in Death." 
" Chapter 229, section 2B sets out the general rule allowing depend~nts of employees who 
die through their employer's negligence to recover damages, unless there is a contrary provi-
sion in chapter 152. G.L. c. 229, § 2B. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2096, 413 N.E.2d at 702. 
" /d. at 2096, 2097-98, 413 N.E.2d at 702, 703. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2097, 413 N.E.2d at 702. 
•• In certain situations, an employer· can defend against an action ansmg from an 
employee's inj\ll'Y by proving that the injury was caused by the. negligence of a fellow 
employee. See Zarba v. Lane, 322 Mass. 132, 136, 76 N.E.2d 318, 320-21 (1947). An 
employer's ability to use this defense is regulated by c;hapter 152, sections 66 & 67. See also Fer-
riter v. Daniel O'COnnell~s Sons, Inc., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2091 n.18, 413 N.E.2d at 699 
n.18. 
•• /d. at 2098 n.30, 413 N.E.2d at 703 n.30 . .. /(/ 
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While premised on an early. case, the Court's decision in Ferriter is much 
in line with the developing modern principles of tort and compensation law. 
Actions for the loss of consortium were held valid in this state in Diaz v. Eli 
Lilly & Co. 43 With Ferriter, the right of action for loss of parental society, a 
logical extension of Diaz, is now firmly established in this commonwealth. 
To deny these claims to family members of employees injured on the job 
because of the existence of workers' compensation would be to deny them 
to some of those most in need of such protection. 
The Court's reaffirmation of the independent rights of family members 
brings to bear some of the fiscal and legal pressure needed to help promote 
health and safety on the job. Such pressure is largely absent in the relatively 
low-cost compensation scheme and is attenuated by the Court's decision to 
reject the dual capacity doctrine in Longever. 44 At the same time, Ferriter 
has raised fears of opening the floodgates of litigation. Justice Quirico's 
dissent expressed concern for the decision's impact on clogged court 
dockets, on the financial risks to which employers would now be subject 
and even on the future viability of Massachusetts industry. 45 Judge Quirico 
even went so far as to cite the number of claims now handled before the In-
dustrial Accident Board and the monetary amount of lump sum settlements 
as evidence for his position. 46 
Such discussion is a departure from the usual rule of statutory construc-
tion that consideration of expenses resulting from a court's reading of the 
statute should·not be allowed to influence the court in reaching its result. 47 
If there exists a backlog, solutions should focus on preventing the dilatory 
tactics of attorneys, expanding the number of judges, and preventing in-
dustrial injuries with strong health and safety law. Those suffering from the 
results of industrial injuries should be the last to bear the brunt of an inef-
fective court system. 
§ 8.5. Third Party Actions-Wrongful Death-Reimbursement of In-
surer. As can be seen from the above sections, the Supreme Judicial Court 
was confronted with a variety of issues this past Survey year which dealt on-
ly indirectly with the substantive claims and procedures of an employee 
against an insured employer for an injury occurring on the job. Another 
major case, also decided this Survey year, which falls into a similar category 
is Eisner v. Hertz Corporation. 1 In Eisner the Court addressed the complex 
issues concerning the workmen's compensation insurer's right to reimburse-
" 364 Mass. 153, 167-68, 302 N.E.2d 555, 564 (1973). 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1767, 1770, 408 N.E.2d 857, 859 (1980). Section 5.3, supra, is 
devoted to the Longever case. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2108, 413 N.E.2d at 708. 
" Id. at 2108, 413 N.E.2d at 708. 
" In Re Madden, 222 Mass. 487, 496-97, 111 N.E. 379, 383-84 (1916). 
§ 8.5. ' 1980 Mass. Adv: Sh. 1667, 407 N.E.2d 1286. 
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ment from monies received by the employee's widow and children as a 
result of a suit against a third party for wrongful death and loss of consor-
tium. 
Chapter 1 52, section 1 5 governs suits against persons other than the 
employer who are liable for injuries for which workmen's compensation is 
payable.1 Subject to certain restrictions, section 15 allows either the work-
men's compensation insurer or the injured employee to s.ue the third party 
liable for the employee's injury. 3 No matter who brings the suit, any 
recovery up to the amount which the insurer has paid the employee is for the 
benefit of the insurer. 4 Another key statutory provision is chapter 152, sec-
tion 1(4), which defines "employee" to include the employee's legal 
representatives, dependents, and other persons to whom compensation may 
be paid, if the actual employee is dead.' Based on these two provisions as 
applied to a wrongful death action, the Eisner Court held that the language 
of section 15 governing distribution of proceeds applied to those 
beneficiaries of a wrongful death action who meet the section 1(4) after-
death definition of "employee."6 The Court held that section 15 controls 
distribution even where .there are other death action beneficiaries who are 
outside the after-death definition of "employee," which status puts them 
outside the control of section 15 and therefore on equal footing with the in-
surer to claim the proceeds of the death action.' The Court also held that 
the insurer was not entitled to reimbursement from that portion of the set-
tlement allocated to loss of consortium. 8 
The employee, Robert Eisner, was injured in the course of his employ-
ment as a truck driver. 9 Eisner died 6 days later, leaving a widow, one 
dependent minor child, and three children over eighteen years of age. 10 Mr. 
Eisner received compensation benefits for his injuries until his death and 
thereafter his widow and minor child received death benefits from the in-
surer.11 
Mrs. Eisner, as administratrix, brought suit under the provisions of 
chapter 152, section 15 in the United States District Court, District of 
Massachusetts, against Hertz Corporation, the lessor of the truck, and In-
ternational Harvester, the manufacturer of the truck. 11 It also appears that 
Mrs. Eisner sued as an individual for loss of consortium. 13 The suit was set-
' G.L. c. 152, § 15. 
3 /d . 
• /d. 
' G.L. c. 152, § 1 (4). 
• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1671-72, 407 N.E.2d at 1289. 
7 !d. 
' /d. at 1673-74, 407 N.E.2d at 1290. 
• !d. at 1667, 407 N.E.2d at 1287. 
10 /d. 
" /d. at 1667-68, 407 N.E.2d at 1287. 
" /d. at 1668, 407 N.E.2d at 1287. 
" /d. at 1668, 1673, 407 N.E.2d at 1287, 1290. 
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tied by an agreement of the parties, which allocated various amounts of the 
proceeds to the claims for personal injury, loss of consortium, and 
wrongful death. 14 The insurer joined in the agreement.~' The statutory 
beneficiaries of the death action included the three children of the employee 
over legal age, who did not receive compensation benefits. 16 The insurer 
sought reimbursement of compensation payments from the amounts 
recovered by the widow and dependent child. 1' 
The United States District Court awarded the insurer reimbursement only 
from the proceeds of the employee's personal injury claim and denied reim-
bursement from the death action and action for loss of consortium. 11 The 
insurer appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit certified two questions to the Supreme Judicial Court for a decision. 19 
The first question was whether a workmen's compensation insurer is en-
titled to be reimbursed under section 15 from those portions of the net pro-
ceeds of a third party settlement allocated to recipients of workmen's com-
pensation benefits from wrongful death where the statutory beneficiaries in 
the death action also included three children who were not recipients of 
compensation benefits. 20 The second question was whether a workmen's 
cgmpensation insurer is entitled to be reimbursed under section 15 from 
those portions of the net proceeds of a third party settlement allocated to 
the loss of consortium of the widow. 21 
In answering the first question, the Supreme Judicial Court initially had 
to decide whether section 15 applied to actions for wrongful death. 22 Sec-
tion 15 generally allows insurers to be reimbursed for any compensation 
benefits they have paid where the employee recovers from a negligent third 
party. 23 Based on the reasoning that Mrs. Eisner was an employee within the 
meaning of § 1 (4) of the Act, 24 that wrongful death actions have traditional-
ly been considered within section 15, 25 and that since 1971 wrongful death 
actions have been specifically mentioned in section 15, 26 the Court held that 
section 15 was applicable to the case at hand. 2 ' 
The Court went on, however, to point out that some of the beneficiaries 
of the wrongful death action in Eisner were not dependents and therefore 
" /d. at 1668, 407 N.E.2d at 1287. 
" /d. 
" /d. at 1668-69, 407 N.E.2d at 1288. 
" /d. at 1671, 407 N.E.2d at 1289. 
" /d. at 1668, 407 N.E.2d at 1287. 
19 /d. 
20 /d. at 1668-69, 407 N.E.2d at 1287-88. 
" /d. at 1669, 407 N.E.2d at 1288. 
22 /d. 
" G.L. c. 152, § 15. 
24 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1669-70 & n.4, 407 N.E.2d at 1288 & n.4. 
" /d. at 1670, 407 N.E.2d at 1289. 
26 /d. 
27 /d. 
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not employees as defined in section 1 (4). 28 In such a situation, the Court 
observed, the share of the proceeds going to the nondependent children was 
not subordinate to the insurer's right to reimbursement. 29 Indeed, the in-
surer did not seek reimbursement from the nondependents' shares. 30 The 
question facing the Court was whether the insurer could still seek reim-
bursement from the death action shares of the ''employees'' (the widow and 
dependent child) under section 15, or whether the presence of non-
dependents among the death action beneficiaries made section 15 wholly in-
applicable. 31 
The primary principle governing the Court's resolution of this question 
was that an employee "should not recover both workmen's compensation 
benefits and damages at law for the same injury." 32 The widow and depend-
ent child had received compensation benefits and thus the Court held that 
the insurer was entitled to reimbursement. 33 
The plaintiff argued the presence of nondependents among the 
beneficiaries rendered the reimbursement provisions of section 15 entirely 
inapplicable. 34 The plaintiff's reasoning was based on Reidy v. Old Colony 
Gas Co. 35 which held that the workmen's compensation insurer did not 
have a right to commence a death action unless all of the beneficiaries to 
such an action received compensation benefits. 36 Without this right to in-
itiate a section 15 action, plaintiff argued, the insurer has no corresponding 
right to reimbursement. 3 ' 
The Court rejected plaintiff's position by looking to the language of sec-
tion 15 which it felt distinguished between those entitled to sue, from which 
the insurer was concededly excluded, and those entitled to receive proceeds 
from the suit. 38 "[W]e think," the Court stated, "that the clause, 'the sum 
recovered shall be for the benefit of the insurer,' applies to any 'employee' 
action within§ 15."39 Reasoning that there is no connection between the in-
surer's right to sue and its right to reimbursement, 40 the Court held that the 
insurer was entitled to proceeds from the widow's and the minor dependent 
child's share of the settlement. 41 
" /d. at 1671, 407 N.E.2d at 1289. 
" /d. at 1671, 407 N.E.2d at 1289 (citing Reidy v. Old Colony Gas Co., 315 Mass. 631, 
634-35, 53 N.E.2d 707, 710 (1944)). 
30 /d. 
" /d. 
" /d. 
" /d. 
•• Id. 
" 315 Mass. 631, 53 N.E.2d 707 (1944). 
" /d. at 634, 53 N.E.2d at 710. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1671, 407 N.E.2d at 1289. 
" /d. at 1672, 407 N.E.2d at 1289. 
"/d . 
•• /d. 
•• /d. at 1673, 407 N.E.2d at 1290. 
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The plaintiff also maintained that double recovery was not an issue since 
the compensation claim and the death action had different elements. 42 In 
support of this position, plaintiff pointed to the difference between the 
limited $51.00 weekly benefits received by the widow and her child and the 
monies available in a death action. 43 The Court was not persuaded. It stated 
that determination of whether an employee had received double recovery 
did not focus on the dollar amounts recovered but upon the nature of the in-
jury asserted. 44 The insurer's right to reimbursement would attach, ac-
cording to the Court, if the injury is compensable. 45 The compensable in-
jury must also create the liability for damage which the plaintiff seeks to en-
force, the Court observed. 46 In the instant case, the Court ruled, the com-
pensable injury, death, was the very essence of the plaintiff's claim. 47 
Unless the insurer was allowed reimbursement, the Court found, the widow 
and dependent child would receive double recovery. 48 The Court further 
noted that the insurer could set off future payments against the sums 
recovered by the widow and dependent child. 49 
Plaintiff also argued that it would be unfair to award the insurer reim-
bursement when it did not participate in the risk of the litigation. ' 0 If she 
had lost, the plaintiff maintained, the insurer would not have been liable for 
any of the litigation costs. 51 The Court felt, however, that since section 15 
required the insurer to bear its share of the litigation costs when the plaintiff 
succeeded, the inequity was not unreasonable. 5 2 
Thus, the Eisner Court read section 15 to require a deceased employee's 
dependents to pay certain proceeds received in personal injury and wrongful 
death claims to the workmen's compensation insurer, even in those cases 
where the presence of nondependent wrongful death beneficiaries would 
have prevented the insurer from initiating the suit. This holding raises a 
question as to whether the court considered the purpose of section 15, which 
is to ensure that the wrongdoer bear the ultimate burden of the harm he 
caused. 53 Assuming that the nondependent children do not have the 
resources to maintain a suit, unless the widow initiated the third party suit 
and shouldered its costs and risks, the wrongdoer would escape untouched. 
The negative effect of modifying the rule against double recovery in this 
., /d. at 1672, 407 N.E.2d at 1289 . 
• , /d. 
•• /d. at 1672, 407 N.E.2d at 1290 . 
•• /d . 
•• /d. 
" /d. 
•• /d. at 1673, 407 N.E.2d at 1290. 
•• Id~ (citing Richard v. Arsenault, 349 Mass. 521, 524-25, 209 N.E.2d 334, 336 (1965)). 
••· /d. at 1673 n.8, 407 N.E.2d at 1290 n.8. 
" /d. 
52 /d. See G.L. c. 152, § 15. 
" See Furling v. Cronan, 305 Mass. 464, 467, 26 N.E.2d 382, 385 (1940). 
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type of case would be slight, compared to the encouragement that adoption 
of the plaintiff's proposal would give widows and dependent children to 
pursue the tortfeasor causing their decedent's injury. 
The Court then addressed the second question certified by the First Cir-
cuit: whether the insurer's right of reimbursement extended to proceeds 
recovered by Mrs. Eisner for loss of consortium. Section 15 requires reim-
bursement of the insurer only for injuries for which compensation is 
payable. 54 The Court pointed out that Mrs. Eisner did not receive compen-
sation payments for loss of consortium, and that chapter 152 nowhere sug-
gests that loss of consortium is a compensable injut:y. 55 Therefore the in-
surer was held not to be entitled to reimbursement for the damages paid for 
loss of consortium. ' 6 
From a practical point of view, it should be noted that the Court in Eisner 
rendered its decision based on the stipulation of the parties as to the alloca-
tion of proceeds as settlement of the various injuries suffered. The Court 
concluded that the parties were bound by the allocation of $5,000.00 to the 
widow's loss of consortium and thus the insurer had no claim on that por-
tion of the settlement. 57 It is therefore clearly to the plaintiff's advantage to 
allocate a reasonable amount to loss of consortium claims in order to shield 
those monies from the insurer's claims for reimbursement. 58 
§ 8.6. Rights of Employee and Insurer to Initiate Third Party Ac-
tions-Section 15 Amended. As discussed with regard to the case of Eisner 
v. Hertz Corp., 1 chapter 152, section 15 generally allows either, an employee 
with a compensable injury caused by a person other than the insured 
employer, or the employer's insurer, to bring an action against the third 
party. 2 Under the 1972 version of section 15, "either the employee or in-
surer may proceed to enforce the liability of such person, but the insurer 
may not do so unless compensation has been claimed or paid under an 
agreement.'' 3 The employee could maintain complete control over the right 
to initiate the third party action by bringing the action at law before he 
claimed or accepted compensation. His right to receive the benefits of the 
compensation act thereafter was not diminished, since the first sentence of 
section 15 eliminated any necessity of election between compensation and 
third party action. 4 If, however, the employee had not already brought the 
•• G.L. c. 152, § 15. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1673, 107 N.E.2d at 1290 . 
•• /d. 
" 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1673, 407 N.E.2d at 1290. 
" For a discussion of the mechanics of settling a third party claim, see Sugarman, The Third 
Party Claim, WORKER'S COMPENSATION: PRACTICE, SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE, MCLE-NELI, 
Inc. (1980 ed.) at 91-98. 
§ 8.6. ' 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1667, 407 N.E.2d 1286. Eisner is described in§ 5.4 supra. 
' G.L. c. 152, § 15. 
' Acts of 1971 c. 888, § 1. This version was applicable to cases arising on and after its effec-
tive date, January 12, 1972. 
• G.L. c. 152, § 15. 
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action against the third party, his filing a claim for compensation or accept-
ing compensation under a voluntary agreement blew a whistle for a race to 
the courthouse. There was no time within which one party or the other was 
given the exclusive right to bring the action, but either the employee or the 
insurer could initiate the action and gain control over the proceeding against 
the third party. 
This situation was corrected by the 1980 amendment, passed this Survey 
year. The following language was added to section 15, "[e]ither the 
employee or insurer may proceed to enforce the liability of such person, but 
the insurer may not do so unless compensation has been paid in accordance 
with sections six, seven, eight, ten or eleven nor until seven months follow-
ing the date of such injury.''' The employee therefore has complete control 
of the right to initiate the third party suit, even if he has brought a compen-
sation claim, for the first seven months after the injury, and even after that 
date the insurer has no right to bring the action unless it has paid compensa-
tion under an agreement, 6 an order of compensation,' a decision of a single 
member, 8 a decision of a reviewing board, 9 or a judgment of the superior or 
appellate court. 10 The employee thus has unrestricted power to initiate the 
third party suit, but the insurer has a reserve right to do so if the employee, 
receiving compensation, fails to take the initiative. 
§ 8. 7. Federal Health and Safety Regulations-Access by the Employee 
to Exposure Data And Medical Records. The Massachusetts Industrial 
Accident Board has the power to issue rules expanding the injured 
employee's rights to pre-trial discovery in a compensation case. • In practice, 
however, there are no discovery mechanisms available beyond the deposi-
tions and interrogatories for which the statute provides. 2 This restriction 
may be a significant handicap where certain facts essential to an employee's 
claim of injury are in the exclusive possession of the employer or insurer. 
Knowledge of the chemical composition and strength of ingredients used in 
an employer's work process for example, may be vital to the proof of a 
claim for industrial disease. Yet, the Board has created no direct means 
whereby the employee can obtain such information prior to a hearing. 
Ultimately, the employee must rely on the discretion of the single member 
hearing the case in allowing him or her latitude in overcoming this handicap 
through cross-examining company experts which he or she has called, 
through subpoenas, or through taking medical testimony de bene. 3 
' Acts of 1980, c. 488, applicable to injuries on or after October 9, 1980. 
' G.L. c. 152, § 6. 
' G.L. c. 152, § 7. 
• G.L. c. 152, § 8. 
' G.L. c. 152, § 10. 
10 G.L. c. 152, § II. 
§ 8.7. I G.L. c. 152, § 5. 
l /d. 
' See id. 
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In this Survey year, however, amendments were made to federal health 
and safety regulations which aid the employee in obtaining this needed in-
formation. 29 C.F.R. § 7 1910.20, effective August 21, 1980, requires 
employers to give workers and their representatives access to their medical 
records, exposure data and research studies on toxic substances they work 
with, and any other files their company keeps on health and safety. • The 
new regulation requires employers to save medical records for 30 years after 
an employee leaves work, and also to save exposure data and research stud-
ies for 30 years.' This may prove to be a valuable new rule, especially in the 
context of the continual weakening of the federal health and safety regula-
tions which have taken place in recent years. 
• 29 C.F.R. § 1910.20 (a), (b) (1980). 
' 29 C.F.R. § 1!H0.20 (d). 
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